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THE STATUS OF THE PUBLIC USE
REQUIREMENT: POST-MIDKIFF
EUGENE A. BOYLE*
When we depart from the natural import of the term 'oublic use,"
and substitute ... that of public utility, public interest, common
benefit, general advantage or convenience, or that still more indefi-
nite term public improvement, is there any limitation which can be
set to the exertion of legislative will in the appropriation of private
property.,
I. INTRODUCTION
The power of eminent domain enables a government, upon payment
of just compensation, to condemn a person's private property. This
extraordinary power is subject only to the requirement that condemna-
tion be for a legitimate public use.2 The term "public use," however,
has eluded precise definition.3 Although "public use" once was
* B.A., Lawrence University, 1983; J.D. Washington University, 1986.
1. Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9, 60 (N.Y. 1837) (Tracy,
Sen., concurring).
2. The fifth amendment to the Constitution contains the provision generally re-
ferred to as the public use clause. The provision states in pertinent part: "nor shall
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONsT.
amend. V. Read literally, the clause does not prevent the government from taking prop-
erty for private use, but only states that when property is taken for public use, compen-
sation must be paid. Nevertheless, courts have consistently viewed the clause as an
implicit prohibition against takings for private use. 2 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMI-
NENT DOMAIN § 7.0112] (rev. 3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as 2 NICHOLS); See also
Illinois Toll Highway Comm'n v. Eden Cemetery Ass'n., 16 Ill.2d 539, 543, 158 N.E.2d
766, 768 (1959) (in absence of constitutional authorization, general rule is that property
cannot be taken for private use).
3. 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.02.
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thought to require public ownership,4 courts have gradually expanded
the concept to include transfers to private individuals when such trans-
fers ultimately benefit the public. State and local authorities, recogniz-
ing the effectiveness of condemnation as a tool for social and economic
reform, constantly seek to widen the scope of the eminent domain
power through redefinition of the term "public use."5
These attempts have met with nearly unanimous judicial approval.
Thus, when the Hawaii legislature decided to break up the large,
landed estates present within Hawaii, eminent domain provided a
ready vehicle. The major landowners in Hawaii for many years had
resisted pressure by the legislature to sell off large portions of their
residential property, preferring instead to lease it out under long-term
lease agreements.6 Consequently, the legislature enacted the Hawaii
Land Reform Act of 1967,7 whereby tenants under these long-term
leases could petition to have the property condemned and transferred
to them in fee. In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,8 the United
States Supreme Court upheld this radical approach to land reform, rul-
ing that the deconcentration of fee simple ownership was a legitimate
public purpose.9
Midkiff is the most recent in a line of cases that has stretched the
4. See infra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
5. With a substantial degree of success, condemning agencies have attempted to
extend the public use label to a wide array of activities. See, e.g., City of Phoenix v.
Phoenix Civil Auditorium & Convention Center Ass'n., 99 Ariz. 270, 277, 408 P.2d
818, 822 (1965) (construction of convention center valid public use); City of Oakland v.
Oakland Raiders, 31 Cal.3d 656, modified, 32 Cal.3d 60, 73, 64 P.2d 835, 841 (1982)
(acquisition of sports franchise may constitute public use); Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 636, 304 N.W.2d 455, 459 (1981) (per curiam) (con-
struction of General Motors factory satisfies public use requirement); Courtesy Sand-
wich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 389, 190 N.E.2d 402, 405, 240
N.Y.S.2d 1, 6, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963) (activity functionally related to
construction of World Trade Center meets public use test). But cf Baycol, Inc. v.
Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So.2d 451 (Fla. 1975) (building of shopping center does not
constitute public use).
6. 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 184 § 1, cited in Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 815
(9th Cir. 1983), rev'dsub nom. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
The landowners' reluctance to sell large tracts of property was in response to their fear
of adverse tax consequences. See Brief for Appellants at 2, n.6, Hawaii Housing Auth.
v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
7. 1967 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 307 (codified as amended HAWAII REv. STAT.
§ 516 (1976)).
8. 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
9. Id. at 2331.
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public use limitation to its outer boundary. Indeed, one might reason-
ably ask, as courts have been doing for nearly 150 years,"0 whether
there remain any discernible restraints on a government's power to ac-
quire private property.
This Note will argue that in cases when property is condemned for
transfer to private individuals, claims of public benefit should not be
left to speculation. Courts must require condemning agencies to reveal
the facts upon which their decisions rest so that a reviewing court can
determine effectively whether a public purpose actually exists. Part II
examines the historical development of the public use limitation, pay-
ing particular attention to the situations in which legislatures have
most frequently applied the doctrine. This section also reviews judicial
responses to the various applications. Part III analyzes Midkiff in
light of both precedent and the unique land situation present in Ha-
waii. Part IV identifies the major problems with an expansive reading
of the public use requirement and suggests approaches to re-establish
the doctrine as an effective limitation on eminent domain.
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC USE LIMITATION
A. Genesis
While scholars have engaged in lively debate, one can probably trace
the birth of the eminent domain power to the early days of the Roman
Empire."i Etymological birth, however, did not occur until the seven-
teenth century when Hugo Grotius, describing the relationship be-
tween property and the state, applied the term "dominuim eminens." 2
Traditionally, justification for a sovereign's right to expropriate private
property has rested on the premise that such power is essential to effec-
10. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
11. Historians often cite the Roman aqueducts and the long, straight roads running
through the Empire as evidence that some type of expropriation power existed. It ap-
pears, however, that takings during this time were without compensation and without
meaningful legal proceedings to determine the validity of government action. See Jones,
Expropriation in Roman Law, 45 LAW Q. REv. 512, 516 (1929); Stoebuck, A General
Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 554 (1972). Other scholars, most
notably Nichols, doubt that the Romans recognized any power of expropriation and
claim that they built roads and aqueducts on primarily conquered territory that the
government possessed. See 1 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 1.2[l]
(rev.3d ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as I NICHOLS].
12. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 11, at § 1. 12[] (citing H. GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI ET
PACIs 20 (1625)).
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tive government.13 The accepted theory is that eminent domain is an
inherent attribute of sovereignty that arises simultaneously with the
formation of government. 4
The civil law writers, however, contributed much more to the evolu-
tion of eminent domain law than a useful nomenclature. Undoubtedly
concerned with the awesome magnitude of the power to condemn, as
well as with eminent domain's offensiveness to notions of private own-
ership of property, Grotius and his contemporaries searched for some
limiting principles.1" They agreed that the state should limit its exer-
cise of eminent domain to situations affecting the public good, but were
in disagreement concerning the precise standard to apply to such a de-
termination.1 6  These differences, however, did not diminish the
profound effect their discourse had on the development of the public
use doctrine in America.
Throughout the Colonial period in America, the eminent domain
power received very little attention. This was due primarily to the fact
that there existed an abundance of undeveloped land so that govern-
ments rarely needed to turn to private property when they felt a need
to expand. 7 If condemnation became necessary, the only issue likely
13. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875) ("The right is the off-
spring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by
its fundamental law.").
14. Professor Stoebuck questions the fundamental soundness of the inherent power
theory, taking issue with the assumption that government would cease to function if it
did not have the power to condemn. Nevertheless, he admits that American courts and
commentators approve the theory. Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 559-60.
15. John Locke, perhaps the most influential of these civil law writers, was reluctant
to recognize a sovereign right to seize private property. Locke wrote:
The supreme power cannot take from any man any part of his property without his
own consent. For the preservation of property being the end of government, and
that for which men enter into society, it necessarily supposes and requires that the
people should have property, without which they must be supposed to lose that by
entering into society which was the end for which they entered into it; too gross an
absurdity for any man to own.
J. LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT 187-88 (Everyman's Library ed. 1924) (1st ed. n.p.
1690) (quoted in Note, Public Use, Private Use, and Judicial Review in Eminent Do-
main, 58 N.Y.U.L. REV. 409, 412 n.16 (1983)).
16. Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 586, 595. Their differences were basically matters of
degree. For example, Grotius believed that private property could be taken for "public
advantage," H. GROTIUS, supra note 12, at 385, while Pufendorf took the stricter view
that it had to be for "necessity of the state." S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET
CENTIUM 1285 (C. and W. Oldfather trans. 1934).
17. See Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Re-
quiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1949). The author also points out that the effect of a
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to be in dispute was whether the state had to pay compensation. s By
the end of the seventeenth century, landowners injured by eminent do-
main usually could obtain some form of court hearing to establish their
damages. 9 With respect to the actual purposes for which government
might validly condemn land, however, there seemed to be very little
concern. Whatever the reason for this lack of interest,2 ° it is clear that
the public use doctrine remained largely undeveloped, or at least unar-
ticulated, prior to the American Revolution.2 1
The draftsmen of the federal Constitution, however, were well versed
in the teachings of the civil law writers and adopted many of their ideas
on the sanctity of private property. 22 Accordingly, James Madison's
draft of what eventually became the fifth amendment included the pre-
cursor to the modem public use limitation: "No person shall be...
obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be necessary for public
use, without a just compensation."2 3  This language was amended
taking was less dramatic because of the large amount of unoccupied land on which the
condemnee could relocate. Id.
The first recorded uses of eminent domain in the colonies involved the construction of
roads and mill dams. Nichols reports that the first statute authorizing the condemna-
tion of private property for the construction of public roads appeared in Massachusetts
in 1639. 1 NICHOLS, supra note 1I, at § 1.22[2].
18. Because of the abundance of undeveloped land, governments originally did not
feel an obligation to pay compensation. Note, supra note 17, at 600, n.6; see also
Stoebuck, supra note 11, 572-88 (discussion of development of just compensation
requirement).
19. See Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Policy, 11
ENVTL. L. 1, 13 (1983).
20. Many believe that the British rarely abused the expropriation power, because
there was seldom a need to analyze the public use limitation. Some suggest, however,
that the colonists simply never assumed that the government could take private prop-
erty for anything but a public purpose. Meidinger, supra note 19, at 17; Stoebuck, supra
note 1I, at 594.
21. At the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, only two state
constitutions included provisions dealing with public use of expropriated land. The
Pennsylvania provision, for example, read: "But no part of a man's property can be
justly taken from him, or applied to public uses, without their own consent." PA.
CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VIII. See also VA. CONST. of 1776, Bill of
Rights § 6. The absence of language directly limiting the government's ability to take
land for nonpublic uses suggests that there was very little fear of possible abuses of the
eminent domain power. See Stoebuck, supra note 11, at 591.
22. See Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6
Wis. L. REV. 67, 68-71 (1931); 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.01.
23. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-36 (J. Gales ed. 1789), reprinted in Meidinger, supra
note 19, at 17.
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slightly to its present form: "nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without a just compensation."24 Though many posit that
this modification signified the Framer's intent to dilute the original lan-
guage, evidence of such an intent is considerably lacking.25 The only
clear inference to be drawn from the drafting process is that the public
use limitation emerged as a largely undefined concept that would re-
ceive most of its shaping from the courts.26
B. Early Judicial Treatment
State courts were mainly responsible for developing the contours of
eminent domain law.27 From the beginning, two distinct views defined
when the government could properly condemn private property.
Under the narrow view,28 adopted by the majority of early courts, the
state could take private property only in those cases in which it guaran-
teed the public the right to use such property. In other words, as
courts often declared, the government could not take property from A
and give it to B.29 Courts adopting the narrow view frequently relied
on principles of natural law to support their construction of the public
24. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
25. See Meidinger, supra note 19, at 17. Meidinger suggests that it would be equally
plausible to assume that the Framers were simply economizing their use of language.
Id.
26. Id. at 19.
27. Until 1875 courts did not recognize that the federal government had its own
eminent domain power. See Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 371-72 (1875). Prior to
1875, if the federal government needed certain land it prodded the state governments to
condemn the land on the federal government's behalf. Id. at 373. This practice was
satisfactory so long as the state courts upheld the condemnations. When state courts
refused to do so, see for example, Trombley v. Humphrey, 23 Mich. 471 (1871), it
became necessary for the federal government to assert its own eminent domain power.
Kohl, 91 U.S. at 373.
Not until 1897 did the Supreme Court hold that the public use limitation of the fifth
amendment applied to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 236 (1897). Thus,
prior to 1897, aggrieved landowners had difficulty getting into federal court.
28. Some commentators describe the narrow view as the "use by the public" test;
this Note will sometimes refer to it as such.
29. See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 DalI.) 386, 388 (1798) (seriatum opinion)
(legislature cannot enact law authorizing it to take property from A and give it to B);
Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill. 140, 145 (N.Y. 1843). In Taylor, the court stated more
forcefully:
[I]f there was not one word of qualification in the whole instrument, I should feel
great difficulty in bringing myself to the conclusion that the clause under consider-




As society expanded, a broader view of public use began to develop.
Under the broader approach, courts equated public use with public ad-
vantage and upheld condemnations that resulted in some tangible pub-
lic benefit.3 ' This view began to gain acceptance in the first half of the
nineteenth century as legislatures and courts sought to encourage pri-
vate development of the nation's vast resources.32 This expansion of
the definition of public use sparked a proliferation of condemnation
actions; some courts responded to that liberal trend by reverting to the
narrow "use by the public" standard. 3
The conservative backlash, however, was short lived. The strictures
of the narrow view began to cause difficult conflicts, particularly in the
manufacturing states in which exploitation of natural resources was es-
their authority if they can take the property of A, either with or without compensa-
tion, and give it to B.
Id. at 145.
Adoption of a broader view of public use, see infra text accompanying note 31,
greatly undercuts the statement that governments cannot take property from A and give
it to B. Only jurisdictions adhering to the narrow view still use similar language when
striking down a taking. See, e.g., City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3, 5
(Ky. 1979). The court stated:
[N]aked and unconditional governmental power to compel a citizen to surrender
his productive and attractive property to another citizen who will use it predomi-
nantly for his own private profit just because such alternative private use is thought
to be preferable in the subjective notion of governmental authorities is repugnant to
our constitutional protections....
Id. One should note that even this language seems to allow the forced transfer of prop-
erty from A to B, where B's use is found to be predominantly public.
30. Gardner v. Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. 1816), illustrates these
courts' reliance on natural law principles. A New York statute authorized a village to
take water from a nearby spring, but did not require the village to compensate the
spring's owner. Ordering the village to pay compensation despite the absence of consti-
tutional language to that effect, Chancellor Kent thought it "a clear principle of natural
equity, that the individual, whose property is thus sacrificed, must be indemnified." Id.
at 164 (citing Grotius, Pufendorf and Bynkershoeck). See generally Grant, supra note
22.
31. See 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.02[2].
32. See Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20
B.U.L. REV. 615, 617 & n.13 (1940). Railroad development was the most significant
factor in the expansion of the public use doctrine during this period. These railroads
were privately owned, profit motivated concerns, yet courts generally found that the
benefit derived by the public from their operation outweighed the incidental private
benefit. See, e.g., Buffalo & N Y.R.R. Co. v. Brainard, 9 N.Y. 100, 108 (1853) (citing
Bloodgood v. Mohawk Hudson R.R., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. 1837)).
33. For a concise discussion of the case law during this period see Berger, The Pub-
lic Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L. REV. 203, 206-12 (1978).
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sential to the maintenance of growing industrialism.34 In a characteris-
tic display of functional jurisprudence, sympathetic courts began to
carve out exceptions to the narrow view in cases in which they thought
condemnation was necessary to protect or enhance the general wel-
fare." Eventually, these exceptions swallowed the rule. 6
The subsequent wavering between the broad and narrow views has
led most courts and commentators to conclude that the distinction
contributes little to the determination of what uses satisfy the public
use clause.3 7 This finding recognizes that neither view can provide ac-
ceptable results in every situation in which condemnation is sought.3"
To the extent that courts maintain the distinction today, most will fol-
34. Id. at 619.
35. See M. HOROWlTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW (1977).
Horowitz argues that beginning with the American Revolution, and extending until
about 1860, a major transformation of our legal system took place. Primarily due to the
great social struggle that was taking place in our developing nation, courts were forced
to bend the formerly immutable common law doctrines. Thus, it came to be during the
nineteenth century that common law judges played a central role in accommodating
social change. Id. at 1, 63.
36. A leading case exemplifying the return to the broad view is Murdock v.
Stickney, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 113 (1851), in which the court upheld a statute authorizing
mill owners to build dams for the operation of their mills. See id. at 117. The obstruc-
tions caused flooding on the lands of upstream property owners who, under the statute,
were limited to compensation. Aware that the statute was in direct conflict with the
"use by the public" approach, the Murdock court sidestepped the issue by stating that,
in effect, no taking had occurred. Id. at 116. The statute was merely an exercise of the
police power that authorized the mill owner to provide a needed public service, but did
not allow him to use the land of his neighbor. Id. To the extent that he did so, the
landowner must be compensated. The end result, of course, was that a taking had oc-
curred; nevertheless, many courts accepted such rhetoric as a way around the narrow
rule. See Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Head, 56 N.H. 386 (1876), affid sub noma. Head v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9 (1885); Great Falls Mfg. Co. v. Fernald, 47 N.H. 444
(1867).
Courts became even more adept at developing ways to evade the use by the public
test. For example, some courts ruled that so long as the public had a theoretical right to
use the property taken, the public use clause was satisfied. Thus, government could
take land to construct a railroad that would ultimately service a single logging com-
pany. Goose Creek Lumber Co. v. White, 219 Ky. 739, 294 S.W. 494 (1927). See
generally Nichols, supra note 32, at 621-23 and cases cited therein.
37. 2 NicHoLs, supra note 2, at § 7.02[3].
38. Id. Nichols points out that under the use by the public test, courts should up-
hold condemnations for hotels and restaurants because such establishments are required
by law to serve all the public without discrimination. Conversely, under the broad view
of public advantage, the construction of a highway in a remote rural area might not be
of sufficient public benefit to justify a taking. Id. at §§ 7-41 to 7-42.
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low the broader public benefit standard.3 9 Thus, no clear standard
emerged from the nineteenth century judicial treatment for determin-
ing when courts should uphold takings. Courts were left with only
elusive guidelines that they have used in a number of circumstances to
achieve results consistent with the social and economic climate of the
moment.40
C. The Modern Framework
In the twentieth century, two developments had significant impact
on the shaping of the modem public use doctrine. The first was the
entry of the federal courts and the imprimatur they placed on the
broad view of public use.4 1 In Mt. Vernon- Woodberry Duck Co. v. Ala-
bama Interstate Co. ,42 the Supreme Court upheld the condemnation of
certain land and water rights for use by a hydro-electric power com-
pany.4 3 In so doing, the Court specifically rejected the use by the pub-
lic test.' Though Mt. Vernon is not binding on state courts, many
continue to rely on the decision as authorizing the abandonment of the
narrow view of public use. 5 In Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles,4 6
39. See Mount Vernon Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Alabama Interstate Power
Co., 240 U.S. 30, 32 (1916) ("inadequacy of use by the general public as a universal test
is established"); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616,
630, 304 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1981) (per curiam) ("the term 'public use' has not received a
narrow or inelastic definition by this court in prior cases").
A minority of courts still follow the narrow rule. In Karesh v. City Council, 271 S.C.
339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978), the court stated: "While in other jurisdictions the power of
eminent domain may be exercised for a public purpose, benefit or the public welfare, the
courts of South Carolina have adhered to a strict interpretation of our constitutional
provision .... " Id. at 342, 247 S.E.2d at 344. Cf Phillips v. Foster, 215 Va. 543, 211
S.E.2d 93 (1975).
40. One author aptly stated: "[W]here the desire was strong to encourage exploita-
tion of natural wealth and to increase industrial development, the courts found-and,
on further explorations, still find-the natural law concept of 'public good' to be of
wondrous elasticity." Note, supra note 17, at 601.
41. See supra note 27 (discussing the federal courts' late arrival in the field of emi-
nent domain).
42. 240 U.S. 30 (1916).
43. Id. at 31.
44. Id. at 32.
45. See, e.g., New York City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 342 (1936).
In Muller, the court asserted that "[u]se of a proposed structure, facility or service by
everybody and anybody is one of the abandoned universal tests of public use." Id.
46. 262 U.S. 700 (1923). Rindge Co. dealt with the proposed taking of private land
for a California coastal highway. The landowners argued that such a highway was not
necessary for public travel and therefore was not a legitimate public use. Id. at 704.
1986)
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the Supreme Court removed any lingering doubts the state courts
might have had concerning the constitutionality of the broad view.
The Court held that it would give great deference to a state's determi-
nation of public use.47
A second major influence on the public use doctrine was the increas-
ing size and complexity of projects that required an exercise of the tak-
ing power. Having spent an entire century establishing the foundation
for an industrialized society, state and local governments now faced the
more difficult problem of maintaining an atmosphere within which that
society could function. The growing demand for energy pressured
many utility companies to develop and explore new sources. 48 Trans-
portation networks required enlarging to handle both an increase in
industrial productivity and the rapidly growing use of the automo-
bile.49 Urban housing, run down by massive migration to the cities,
desperately needed renovation. 0 These projects frequently demanded
a concerted effort by government and the private sector and, conse-
quently, contributed to an expansion of the public use doctrine. 1
Most of the twentieth century cases involving the public use issue
fall into three loosely definable factual categories, each category repre-
senting another step toward the erosion of the public use clause as an
effective limitation on the taking power. These categories are: (1) de-
velopment of transportation and industrial networks; (2) urban re-
newal; and (3) local community prosperity. These divisions, not
intended to be exhaustive, provide a useful organizational framework.
1. Development of Transportation and Industrial Networks
Efforts to develop the branches of our transportation system encoun-
tered little resistance from the public use limitation. Condemnations
for highways, railroads, canals and harbors frequently were upheld
The court responded that what is or is not a legitimate public use depends to a large
extent on local conditions, and judgments by state courts should be given great respect.
Id. at 706.
47. Id. at 706.
48. See, e.g., McMeekin v. Central Carolina Power Co., 80 S.C. 512, 61 S.E. 1020
(1908) (authorizing condemnation for hydroelectric power plant).
49. See, e.g., Shirley v. Russell, 149 Va. 658, 140 S.E. 816 (1927) (condemnation to
build highway).
50. See, e.g., New York Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333 (1936) (approving
taking for urban renewal).
51. See Note, Eminent Domain: Private Corporations and the Public Use Limita-
tions, 11 U. BALT. L. REv. 310, 316 (1982).
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under what became known as the "instrumentality of commerce" ex-
ception to the public use clause.52 Despite the fact that the state trans-
ferred land directly to private individuals or corporations, courts
normally upheld these takings on the assumption that the new trans-
portation services provided were essential to a vital industry-an in-
dustry of which the public was the ultimate beneficiary. 3
In a similar manner, eminent domain provided a useful tool when
governments turned to developing new sources of energy. The
Supreme Court indicated in United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley Au-
thority v. Welch54 that government projects in this area would experi-
ence minimal judicial interference. In Welch, the Tennessee Valley
Authority (TVA) built a large dam that flooded the sole highway into a
small community.55 After failing to reach a settlement, the TVA con-
demned the entire community and joined it to a neighboring national
park.56 The district court invalidated the condemnation on the ground
that the TVA had authority to take only that portion of land necessary
to construct the dam.5 7 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
affirming this judgment on separate grounds, held that the condemna-
tion was not for public use but was merely an effort to limit the TVA's
potential liability under the proposed settlement agreement.58
52. Justice Ryan thoroughly discusses the "instrumentality of commerce" exception
in his dissent in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616,
674-81, 304 N.W.2d 455, 477-80 (1983) (Ryan, J., dissenting). The exception has its
basis in practicality: "With regard to highways, railroads, canals, and other instrumen-
talities of commerce, it takes little imagination to recognize that without eminent do-
main these essential improvements, all of which require particular configurations of
property-narrow and generally straight ribbons of land-would be 'otherwise imprac-
ticable'; they would not exist at all." Id. at 675-76.
53. Charles Wilson, former executive of General Motors, summarized the relation-
ship between private enterprise and the general welfare in the following words:
"[W]hat's good for General Motors is good for the country." Bennett, Eminent Do-
main and Redevelopment: The Return of Engine Charlie, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 115
(1982).
54. 327 U.S. 546 (1946).
55. Id. at 548. In 1942 the TVA authorized the dam to meet the growing demand
for power due to wartime production. Id.
56. Id. at 550. Negotiations centered around the amount of damages TVA would
pay for the road's reconstruction. Rebuilding the old road would have cost about $1.4
million, but all parties agreed that the road was below modem highway standards. Id.
Because the state refused to pay the additional costs of building a new road, the parties
determined that the TVA should acquire all the land in the isolated area. Id. All but six
landowners agreed to the plan. Id. at 551.
57. Id.
58. 150 F.2d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 1945).
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The Supreme Court rejected these arguments, opting for a more def-
erential approach.59 The majority opined that the determination of
public use fell within the province of the legislature and that to avoid
impinging on a traditional legislative function the Court should exer-
cise restraint.' To the extent that this view implied a limited power of
judicial review, three justices concurred only in the result. 61 In the
opinion of the concurring justices, the nature of a use, public or pri-
vate, was a matter for the Court to determine.62 Despite these reserva-
tions, courts frequently cite Welch in support of the proposition that
the judiciary's role in determining public use is a very limited one.63
2. Urban Renewal
The influx of social legislation brought on by the Depression had a
dramatic effect in the areas of urban redevelopment and slum clear-
ance.64 The prospect of federal monies enticed many state and local
governments to vigorously pursue the eradication of urban blight. 65 In
New York City Housing Authority v. Muller,66 the New York Court of
Appeals upheld a statute authorizing the condemnation of slum prop-
erty for land clearance and construction of public housing. 67 Eschew-
59. 327 U.S. at 551-52.
60. Id. The Court cited Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925),
for the proposition that Congress' decision as to what constitutes a public use "is enti-
tled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility."
61. 327 U.S. at 555-58 (Reed J., concurring). Chief Justice Stone joined in this
concurrence and Justice Frankfurter wrote a separate concurring opinion.
62. Id. at 556. Justice Reed stated:
This taking is for a public purpose but whether it is or is not is a judicial question.
Of course, the legislative or administrative decision has great weight but the consti-
tutional doctrine of the Separation of Powers would be unduly restricted if an ad-
ministrative agency could invoke a so-called political power so as to immunize its
action against a judicial examination in contests between the agency and the
citizens.
Id. at 556-57.
63. See, e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984);
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
64. For a good summary of the legislation enacted during the depression era, and
the effect of the Roosevelt administration on housing and land redevelopment, see RIE-
SENFELD & MAXWELL, MODERN SOCIAL LEGISLATION 830-76 (1950).
65. See Meidinger, supra note 19, at 33.
66. 270 N.Y. 333 (1936).
67. Id. at 343. The court emphasized that slum areas had plagued New York for
over 70 years. Id. at 341. The city had previously applied both the taxing and the
police powers, but both failed to stem the flow of urban blight. Id. Thus, the court
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ing the narrow view of actual public use, 68 the court found that the
reduction of juvenile delinquency, crime and disease, afflictions com-
monly associated with slum conditions, was of sufficient public benefit
to satisfy the public use requirement.69
A separate line of urban renewal cases-those involving condemna-
tion of blighted areas for reconveyance to private developers°-caused
greater difficulty. Several courts initially held that condemnations for
the distinct purpose of reconveyance to private concerns, despite any
incidental public benefit, violated the public use clause.71 In 1954,
however, the Supreme Court decided the seminal urban renewal case,
Berman v. Parker.72  Berman examined the constitutionality of the
District of Columbia Redevelopment Act,73 under which the city con-
ducted a large-scale, residential renewal project. The challenge came
from a department store owner whose property the plan had slated for
condemnation. The store was a viable, going concern, but was located
concluded, there could be no objection to the application of the last remaining power.
Id.
68. See supra note 45. It is important to note that while the court purported to
abandon the narrow view of public use, its actual holding did not require it to do so.
Public housing is premised on the idea of availability to every individual, regardless of
that individual's current income. Thus, even though the new housing will accommo-
date only a portion of the public at any given time, every person has at the outset an
equal opportunity to participate in the new use. This differs significantly from the case
where the government condemns land and transfers it directly to another private inter-
est. See infra notes 78-97 and accompanying text (discussing cases in which land is
transferred from one private interest to another).
69. 270 N.Y. at 339. Shortly after the decision in Muller, Congress passed the
United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888 (1937) (current version at 42
U.S.C. §§ 1401-40 (1976)). The Act authorized federal loans and grants to local hous-
ing agencies to clear slums and develop public housing. This legislation, in conjunction
with Muller, has led a great majority of courts to conclude that condemnations for the
dual purpose of slum clearance and public housing construction comport with the pub-
lic use limitation. See Berger, supra note 33, at 214-15 & n.66.
70. Certain limiting restrictions generally attached to these transfers. These restric-
tions usually confined transferees to residential, industrial or commercial development.
See Berger, supra note 33, at 215. By this close regulation of private development, local
governments insured that the public uses they envisioned were carried out.
71. See, e.g., Adams v. Housing Auth., 60 So.2d 663, 669 (Fla. 1952) ("Incidental
benefits accruing to the public from the establishment of some private enterprise is not
sufficient to make the establishment of such enterprise a public use."); Housing Auth. v.
Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 563 (1953) (public benefit does not always justify a taking).
72. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
73. District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, ch. 736, 60 Stat. 790, D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 5-701 to 5-719 (1951) (current version at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 5-801 to
5-820 (1981)).
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in an area in which more than eighty percent of the dwellings failed to
meet minimum housing standards.74 Under the plan, the city was to
condemn the entire area and transfer the land to private developers.
The Court rejected the owner's argument that such a transfer con-
travened the public use requirement. Justice Douglas, writing for the
Court, stated that private enterprise was just one means of effecting the
legitimate end-revival of a blighted community.75 By defining the
issue in terms of the police power rather than the taking power, Justice
Douglas adopted a very lenient standard of public use.7 6 With respect
to the scope of judicial review the Court demanded even less, stating
that Congress' determination of the public interest was "well-nigh
conclusive."77
74. 348 U.S. at 30.
75. Id. at 33.
76. Id. at 32. Justice Douglas stated: "We deal, in other words, with what tradi-
tionally has been known as the police power." Douglas' easy characterization, however,
seems to defy a more basic distinction between the two powers. One court has stated:
[W]e should bear in mind that there is a clear distinction between the power of
eminent domain and the police power. The power of eminent domain is that sover-
eign power to take property for a public use or purpose .... On the other hand,
the police power is that power by which the Government may destroy or regulate
the use of property in order to "promote the health, morals and safety of the com-
munity" ....
Adams Housing Auth., 60 So.2d 663, 666 (Fla. 1952); cf. McCoy v. Sanders, 113 Ga.
App. 565, 569, 148 S.E.2d 902, 905 (1966) (eminent domain is different than the police
power).
In Stevens v. City of Salisbury, 240 Md. 556, 214 A.2d 775 (1966), the Maryland
Supreme Court held that the constitutional limitations on the taking of private property
for public use were not intended to restrain exercises of the police power. Id. at 564,
214 A.2d at 779. This language implies that the standard for a taking of property is
more rigorous than that justifying an exercise of the police power.
77. 348 U.S. at 32. In full context, the statement reads: "Subject to specific consti-
tutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been de-
clared in terms well-nigh conclusive." Id. This language has become a useful source of
authority for courts seeking to justify government exercises of eminent domain. See,
e.g., Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2328-29 (1984) (discussed infra
notes 103-64 and accompanying text); Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of De-
troit, 410 Mich. 616, 633, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460 (1983) (discussed infra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text). See also Berger, supra note 33, at 216; Note, Public Use, Private
Use, supra note 15, at 417.
It is perhaps unfortunate that Justice Douglas felt obligated to apply such broad lan-
guage, for the Court undoubtedly could have reached a similar result under a more
conservative approach. For 30 years, courts recognized slum clearance, to create
cleaner, safer residences, as a valid public use. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying
text. The restrictions limiting the developers to construction of new housing insured
that the benefits of the taking inured primarily to the public. Thus, Justice Douglas
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3. Local Community Prosperity
Were it not for a handful of isolated state court decisions,7" and a
strongly worded dissenting opinion, 9 the cases falling under this gen-
eral heading would clearly mark the end of the modem day public use
requirement. The common thread running through the cases in this
somewhat amorphous, vague category is the involuntary transfer of
property, usually from one private interest to another, on the assump-
tion that the new use will be more beneficial to the community.
Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Associates"° is one of the earlier cases to
refer to community prosperity. The Puerto Rico legislature, as part of
its policy of major agrarian reform, enacted a statute authorizing the
condemnation of vast tracts of farm land formerly owned by several
large, absentee corporations."1 The Court of Appeals for the First Cir-
cuit upheld the statute, stating that local governments are particularly
qualified to make land use decisions that best promote community
prosperity.82 In so holding, however, the court recognized a specific
duty on its part to "make some inquiry into the facts with reference to
which the Legislature acted.",8 3 Based on the depressed social and eco-
nomic conditions existing in Puerto Rico at the time, the court con-
cluded that the legislature had acted reasonably in its attempt to
strengthen the island's agricultural foundation.84
could have found that the Redevelopment Act complied with the public use clause,
without destroying an effective check on legislative determinations of public use. Addi-
tionally, it is significant to note that in Berman the city took land from private individu-
als and put it to an entirely new use. Private developers tore down an area the city
found to be suffering from urban blight, and replaced it with completely new structures.
This fact distinguishes Berman from later cases in which the government authorizes
transfers to private individuals without an accompanying new use. See, e.g., Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984); City of Oakland v. Oakland Raiders,
31 Cal.3d 656, modified, 32 Cal.3d 60, 646 P.2d 835 (1982).
78. See Ownesboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979) (land cannot be con-
demned for conveyance to private industrial developer); Karesh v. City Council, 271
S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978) (shopping center not valid public use).
79. See Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 645, 304
N.W.2d 455, 464 (1981) (Ryan J., dissenting). Justice Ryan's dissent is discussed infra
note 88.
80. 156 F.2d 316 (1st Cir. 1946).
81. Id. at 318.
82. Id. at 324.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 324-25. It is significant that Sugar Associates was a pre-Berman case.
Without access to the sweeping Berman language, the Sugar Associates court was care-
ful to point out the delicate balance of power between legislature and judiciary. Id. at
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In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,8" the Michigan
Supreme Court held that Detroit could condemn an entire residential
community to provide a site for a new General Motors (GM) factory.
Feeling the crunch of an industry-wide recession, GM threatened to
leave Detroit unless the city found a suitable site for a new plant the
company was planning to build.86 The threat occurred when unem-
ployed in Detroit was of "calamitous proportions."87 Thus, when GM
determined that the Poletown area would satisfy its needs, the only
question remaining was whether the courts would sanction the con-
demnation of a healthy, nonblighted community for transfer to a pri-
vate corporation.
Despite caustic dissents by Justices Ryan and Fitzgerald,88 the ma-
jority upheld the condemnation. The court emphasized the judiciary's
extremely limited role in reviewing legislative determination of public
323-24. The opinion gave due respect to the legislative determinations of public use, yet
did not shirk its judicial responsibility regarding the facts upon which those determina-
tions were made. Id.
More recently, courts have found sufficient a nod in the direction of judicial review
and a cite to Berman prior to affirming the legislature's finding of public use. See Note,
supra note 15, at 418.
85. 410 Mich. 610, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
86. Id. at 651, 304 N.W.2d at 467 (Ryan J., dissenting). The recession hit General
Motors (GM) particularly hard because of the company's initial refusal to meet the
competition of the down-sized foreign car market. Bennet, supra note 53, at 139.
Rather than meet the changing nature of the industry, GM preferred to "stick with its
traditional policies, which had earned it dominance of the highly profitable big-car mar-
ket." Id. at n.164 (quoting Burck, How G.M. Turned Itself Around, FORTUNE, Jan. 16,
1978, at 88). As oil prices continued to rise and other auto manufacturers began pro-
ducing down-sized cars, GM finally decided to change its policies. Bennett, supra note
53, at 140. Thus finding itself in a precarious position, GM unleashed its demands on
the City of Detroit. Id.
87. 410 Mich. at 647, 304 N.W.2d at 465. Justice Ryan reported that unemploy-
ment in the city was at 18%. Id. The final agreement evidences the fact that the city
was truly at GM's mercy. In exchange for a proposed 6000 jobs, the city agreed to
acquire and clear a 465-acre site, at a cost of about $200 million, and to convey it to GM
for $8 million. Id. at 656.
88. Id. at 645-84, 304 N.W.2d at 464-82. Ryan contended that the majority had
"seriously jeopardized the security of all private property ownership." Id. After a de-
tailed statement of the facts surrounding the controversy, Ryan carefully distinguished
between public use and public purpose. The latter, he argued, was a less restrictive
standard and applied only to the taxing power. Id. at 666, 304 N.W.2d at 474. Ryan
also strongly disagreed with the majority's deferential approach, stating that "it has
always been the case that this court has accorded little or no weight to legislative deter-
minations of 'public use'." Id. at 667, 304 N.W.2d at 474. See infra notes 178-83 and
accompanying text for further discussion of Justice Ryan's dissent.
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use,8 9 and felt that the city had presented substantial evidence showing
the need for retaining the auto industry.9" In the face of such need, the
court explained that the benefits flowing from keeping GM in Detroit
were sufficiently clear to satisfy the public use requirement.91
In perhaps the most unique application of eminent domain law to
date, the California Supreme Court held, in City of Oakland v. Oak-
land Raiders,9 2 that the taking of a professional sports franchise may
also meet the public use requirement. To prevent the Oakland Raiders,
a successful National Football League franchise, from moving to Los
Angeles, the City of Oakland sued to acquire the team and all inciden-
tal rights and interests.9 3 The trial court granted a motion for sum-
mary judgment in favor of the Raiders,94 but the California Supreme
Court reversed, ordering a full evidentiary hearing on the merits.9"
Noting that the taking of property to build and run an athletic stadium
long had been considered a valid public use,9 6 the court saw no reason
why the same logic could not be applied to the taking of a team playing
within the stadium walls.97
These cases illustrate that the public use requirement is dangerously
close to being read out of the Constitution. Public use, when equated
with any modicum of public benefit, is no more than a convenient label
to apply when legislatures feel one use of property would be more bene-
ficial than another. Clearly, the static and inflexible nature of the nar-
row "use by the public" test makes it an undesirable standard for
dealing with many of the complex situations that arise in our society
today. Nevertheless, it remains the courts' responsibility to insure that
a condemnation does in fact further some clear and significant public
benefit, especially in cases when the immediate beneficiaries of the con-
demnation are private individuals.9" Unless courts begin to define
89. Id. at 633, 304 N.W.2d at 459 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
92. 31 Cal.3d 656, modified, 32 Cal3d 60, 646 P.2d 835 (1982).
93. 32 Cal. 3d at 64, 646 P.2d at 837.
94. Superior Court of Monterey County, No 76044.
95. 32 Cal.3d at 77, 646 P.2d at 844.
96. Id. at 74-75, 646 P.2d at 841-42.
97. Id.
98. It is ironic that one of the best statements of the judiciary's responsibility in this
area comes from the majority opinion in Poletown:
The power of eminent domain is restricted to furthering public uses and purposes
and is not to be exercised without substantial proof that the public is primarily
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some limiting principle, many observers fear that legislatures will be-
come mere conduits for the involuntary transfer of private property
from one individual to another.99
III. HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY V. MIDKIFF
Against this background, the Supreme Court's decision in Hawaii
Housing Authority v. Midkifj" ° appears to stand in wholehearted sup-
port of the liberal trend in eminent domain law. A unanimous Court
upheld the use of the condemnation power to deconcentrate land own-
ership in Hawaii. 0 Many state courts will undoubtedly rely on
Midkiff in much the same manner as they have relied on Berman for
the past thirty years. 102
benefitted. Where, as here, the condemnation power is exercised in a way that
benefits specific and identifiable private interests, a court inspects with heightened
scrutiny the claim that the public interest is the predominant interest being ad-
vanced. Such public benefit cannot be speculative or marginal but must be clear and
significant if it is to be within the legitimate purpose as stated by the Legislature.
410 Mich. at 634-35 (emphasis added).
99. Professor Meidinger, for example, states: "For the most part then, the public
use requirement operates as an incremental and somewhat idiosyncratic restraint-a
slight added drag on takings, the exact operation of which is somewhat unpredictable."
Meidinger, supra note 19, at 42. Justice Ryan, in his Poletown dissent, observes that
"when the private corporation to be aided by eminent domain is as large and influential
as General Motors, the power of eminent domain, for all practical purposes, is in the
hands of the private corporation. The municipality is merely the conduit." 410 Mich.
616, 683, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (1981) (Ryan, J., dissenting).
100. 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
101. Id. at 2331-32.
102. See supra note 77. This also raises an interesting question concerning the ex-
tent to which state courts justifiably can rely on these decisions when interpreting their
own state constitutions. See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individ-
ual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977). Justice Brennan approves a recent trend of
state court decisions that have interpreted their own state constitutions as providing
more protection to individual liberties than the federal Bill of Rights requires. Id. at
495. Justice Brennan states:
[S]tate courts cannot rest when they have afforded their citizens the full protections
of the federal Constitution. State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liber-
ties, their protections often extending beyond those required by the Supreme
Court's interpretation of federal law. The legal revolution which has brought fed-
eral law to the fore must not be allowed to inhibit the independent protective force





A. Land Reform in Hawaii
Prior to annexation, the land of Hawaii was held in a complex tenure
system similar to the feudal system of medieval Europe.1"3 Fee simple
ownership of land was nonexistent; all land was under the control of a
high chief who distributed it to a series of lower chiefs."° Between
1780 and 1850, however, the forces of Westernization began to disman-
tle this land tenure system. 105 Under the "Great Mahele" of 1848,106
the government of Hawaii divided its land into rough thirds, with one
third each going to the king, the chiefs and the common people.
1 7
This redistribution plan, however, resulted in only one percent of the
land ultimately being transferred to the common people.'08 In order to
claim his rightful grant to land, the commoner apparently had to prove
that he actually lived on and cultivated the particular parcel that he
now sought to own.' This required him to appear before a commis-
sion to argue his claim, a burden he had neither the means nor the
inclination to carry." 0 Thus, a large portion of land originally set
aside for the common people remained in the hands of the king and the
chiefs.
This pattern of concentrated land ownership has persisted to the
present'' and has been a source of concern to the Hawaii legisla-
103. For a general discussion from which this section draws heavily, see Levy, Na-
tive Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 848, 848-49 (1975).
104. Id. at 849.
105. Id. at 850-52. The process began with the centralization of all the islands
under the rule of Kamahameha I. European settlers, who received grants of land from
the lower chiefs, prompted this process in an effort to stabilize their holdings. See Brief
of the Hou Hawaiians at 7-9, Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
106 Levy, supra note 103, at 855. The Hawaiian Government opened the "Mahele
Book" on January 27, 1848, into which the king and the chiefs quit-claimed all of their
interests in land. The land was then redistributed in thirds to the Crown, the govern-
ment and the common people. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 856.
109. Id.
110. Id. To stake a claim, a commoner would first need a survey of the individual
tract; most could not even afford to have this done. Further, many of these commoners
reportedly feared reprisals from the chiefs who formerly held the land. Id.
I 11. In 1975, combined holdings of the government and the 72 largest land owners
constituted about 95% of all the land in Hawaii. See 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 184
§ l(a). On Oahu, one of the largest islands, three major landowners owned 58.4% of all
privately held land. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 6, at 2 n.4 (citing Midkiff v.
Amemiya, Civil No. 47103 (Haw. 1st Cir. June 29, 1978) (finding of fact No. 96)). Not
surprisingly, the statistics cited by the appellees portray a less drastic situation. For
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ture. 112 Land owners, fearing the adverse tax consequences flowing
from sales of large tracts of land, continued to lease their property
under long-term contracts. 113 In response to a growing demand for fee
simple land, the legislature determined that the landowners' reluctance
to sell was causing a serious land shortage and was artificially inflating
land values.' 1 4 Further, they found that inflated land prices were con-
tributing significantly to an overall inflationary trend in the cost of
living. 115
To remedy these perceived evils, in 1967 the Hawaii legislature
passed the Hawaii Land Reform Act." 6 Aimed at the redistribution of
residential fee simple land, the Act authorizes certain tenants under
long-term leases to compel the condemnation of the land upon which
their residences are situated. 117 Tenants wishing to own their lots file
an application with the Hawaii Housing Authority (HHA), an agency
set up to administer the Act." 8 Once the HHA determines that certain
statutory requirements have been satisfied, it can initiate condemnation
proceedings.l"9
example, appellees report that on the island of Oahu 69% of new homes in 1981 were
built on land that was sold with the residence in fee. Further, out of the 108,378 resi-
dences on Oahu, single and multi-family units, only 35,539 were on land leased by the
homeowner. See Brief for Appellees at 6 n.18 (citing State of Hawaii Data Book table
486 (1982)), Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984) [hereinafter cited
as Brief for Appellees]. These statistics appear to indicate that the seriousness of the
land shortage existing in Hawaii is subject to considerable dispute.
112. See Brief for Appellants, supra note 6, at 1 n.2. The brief states that since 1955
there had been numerous senate proposals calling for the large estates to divest those
lands they held for investment purposes. Id. As indicated, the landowners had been
highly successful in diverting this pressure.
113. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
114. See 1975 Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 186 § 2(a)(2). This section states: "The re-
fusal of such landowners to sell the fee simple titles to their lands and the proliferation
of such practice of leasing rather than selling land has resulted in a serious shortage of
fee simple residential land and in an artificial inflation of residential land values in the
State." Id.
115. Id. at § 2(a)(7).
116. HAWAII REV. STAT. Ch. 516 (1976). Originally enacted in 1967, see 1967
Hawaii Sess. Laws Act 307, the Act lay dormant for nearly a decade due to questions
about its constitutionality. See Brief for Appellees, supra note 111, at 13. In 1975, the
legislature adopted amendments to the Act designed to "reaffirm and reiterate the find-
ings and declarations of necessity originally set forth in Act 307." 1975 Hawaii Sess.
Laws Act 186 § 1.
117. HAWAn REV. STAT. § 516-22 (1976).
118. Id. at § 516-26.
119. Id. at § 516-22. The Act authorizes the HHA to designate "development
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B. The Midkiff Litigation
One of the largest fee simple landowners in Hawaii is the Bishop
Estates. 2 ' Established in 1887 by the will of Princess Bernice Pauahi
Bishop, the estate is a perpetual charitable trust designed to provide
support for the education of native Hawaiian children."2 ' Long-term
leases generate trust income that the trustees use primarily to maintain
the Kamahameha Schools.' 22 Beginning in 1978, several residential
lessees of Bishop Estate property became interested in acquiring fee
simple title to their lots and filed an application with the HHA. The
HHA reviewed the application and then ordered the trustees of the
estate to submit to arbitration to determine a fair price for the land. 123
Refusing to comply with the HHA's order, the trustees instead brought
an action in federal court claiming that the Land Reform Act was un-
constitutional because it violated the public use clause.' 24
The district court upheld the Act as a valid exercise of the police
power.' 2 ' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed,
1 26
viewing the Land Reform Act as a "naked attempt" to take property
tracts" of not less than five acres. After 25 tenants, or tenants on half of the lots in the
tract, whichever is fewer, apply to purchase their lots, the HHA must hold hearings to
determine whether acquisitions of such lots would be consistent with the purposes of the
Act. Id. After acquisition, the HHA can authorize a loan of up to 90% of the purchase
price to those tenants who are unable to obtain sufficient funds. Id. at § 516-34.
The drastic nature of this legislation is apparent. In effect, it allows any tenant in a
specified development tract, regardless of his financial situation, to force the sale of the
land upon which his house is built. One article states:
The Hawaii Land Reform Act constitutes a fairly radical approach to the special
land problems that face Hawaii; its radical nature can be traced directly to the
political pressures that have built up over decades as the major landowners have
fought and defeated land reform measures time and time again.
Conahan, Hawaii's Land Reform Act. Is it Constitutional?, 6 HAWAII B.J. 31 (1969).
120. Levy, supra note 103, at 870-72. Some estimates report holdings of the estate
to constitute about nine percent of the land in Hawaii. Id.
121. Brief for Appellees, supra note 11, at 3.
122. Id. at 4.
123. Id. at 14.
124. Midkiff v. Tom, 483 F. Supp. 62, 65 (D. Hawaii 1979), afl'd sub nom. Hawaii
Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
125. 483 F. Supp. at 68. The court abandoned the public use requirement in favor
of a police power-due process analysis, stating that "the Legislature had the right,
pursuant to its police power, to conclude that the general welfare of the people of Ha-
waii was served by condemning the land." Id. This analysis completely ignores the
distinction between the police power and the taking power. Indeed the court states that
it would be "irrational" to hold eminent domain to a standard different than that ap-
plied to other government interferences with private property. Id. at 67.
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owned by the lessor and transfer it to the lessee solely for the latter's
personal benefit.127 The circuit court focused on the fact that the tak-
ing effected no change in the use of the property. 128 The end result,
therefore, was merely an involuntary transfer of title from one person
to another, a result the court found in direct conflict with settled
law. 129 With respect to the scope of judicial review, the court read the
Berman language as demanding a high level of scrutiny. 130
The Supreme Court took a much narrower view of the judiciary's
role in eminent domain cases. Reciting full paragraphs of the Berman
opinion, the Court insisted that the public use requirement was "coter-
minous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers." '13 1 This view,
reminiscent of an approach first taken over a century ago, 132 grants to
legislatures the widest possible latitude in determining what constitutes
a public use. Indeed, as the Court emphasized, the judicial inquiry is at
an end once it becomes apparent that the legislature's determination of
public use does not "involve an impossibility."1 33
Turning to the merits, the Court found that the Hawaii Legislature's
attempt to eliminate the evils it associated with a continuing land oli-
gopoly was clearly within the purview of a state's police power.134 Ac-
126. Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. Hawaii Housing
Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
127. 702 F.2d at 798.
128. Id. at 796. Judge Alarcon's analysis of the applicable case law revealed the
following five basic situations in which takings were considered to be for a public use:
(1) Takings for historically accepted public use; (2) takings that result in a changed use
of the land; (3) takings that result in changed possession of the land; (4) takings that
result in a transfer of property to the government; and (5) takings of a nominal or
inconsequential degree. Id. at 793-96.
129. Id. at 793 (citing Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896)
and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (seriatum opinion)). See supra note 29
and accompanying text.
130. 702 F.2d at 797. The court pointed out that the Berman language, so often
quoted in support ofjudicial deference, begins with the phrase "Subject to specific consti-
tutional limitations... " Id. (quoting Berman, 348 U.S. at 32). (emphasis supplied by
court). The court continued: "We read this language as requiring the judiciary to
scrutinize carefully any legislative attempt to take private property so as to determine if
it is in violation of any constitutional provision." 702 F.2d at 797.
131. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321, 2329 (1984).
132. See supra note 36 (discussing Murdock v. Stickney, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 113
(1851)).
133. 104 S.Ct. at 2329 (quoting Old Dominion Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66
(1925)).
134. Id. at 2330 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117
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cording to Justice O'Connor, the condemnation scheme was a rational
approach to correcting this problem and, therefore, the Court would
not question the plan's ultimate wisdom. 3 The Court also rejected
the contention that the Land Reform Act authorized purely private
takings. The purpose of this legislation, in the Court's opinion, was
restoration of the fee simple market and any benefit to individual par-
ties was merely incidental.
136
C. Analysis
While the Midkiff opinion warrants criticism in the end, there are
considerations that support the Court's deferential approach. The
Supreme Court has consistently, and perhaps wisely, been reluctant to
interfere with the states' use of their eminent domain power.1 37 In
Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 3 ' the Court noted that while
determining the public or private nature of a use is ultimately a judicial
question, the answer will always vary with respect to local condi-
tions. 139 Because it is reasonable to assume that state legislatures will
be most familiar with local conditions, their judgments should receive
(1978)). The Court's reliance on Exxon is spurious; it assumes the very question to be
answered. Exxon dealt with a Maryland statute enacted to regulate its retail gas indus-
try during the oil crisis of 1973. 437 U.S. at 121. The statute required oil producers and
refiners, as a prerequisite to doing business in Maryland, to divest themselves of all
retail operations within the state. Id. at 119. The issue before the Court was whether
this regulation was a valid exercise of the state's police power and, if so, whether it
survived commerce clause analysis. Id. at 124-25. There was, however, no taking in-
volved in Exxon: while certain types of situations possibly justify excessive state regula-
tion it does not necessarily follow that a taking would also be justified. See supra note
76.
135. 104 S.Ct. at 2330.
136. Id. at 2331-32.
137. See, e.g., Hairston v. Danville Ry., 208 U.S. 598, 607 (1908) (improper for
Supreme Court to invalidate a taking that state court upheld); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist.
v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 160 (1896) (decisions of state legislatures and state courts to be
treated with great respect); People of Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Ass'n, 156 F.2d 316,
324 (Ist Cir. 1946) (local governments particularly qualified to make local land use
decisions).
138. 262 U.S. 700 (1923). See supra note 46 (discussing Rindge Co.).
139. Id. at 705. See also 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.05. Nichols states:
[W]hat is a public use is to a great extent a local question, and its determination in
the courts of the different states has been influenced by considerations touching the
resources, the capacity of the soil, and the relative importance of industries to the
general public welfare .... In all these respects conditions vary so much in the
different states that different results may well be expected.
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great respect from the federal courts. Only in those cases in which it is
abundantly clear that state action violates the public use requirement
should the federal courts step in to strike down that action. 140
Another factor which undoubtedly influenced the Court is the pecu-
liar nature of the land situation in Hawaii. Regardless of its effect on
the economy, it is indisputable that there exists an unusually high con-
centration of fee simple ownership in Hawaii. 4 ' Prior to 1967, the
legislature constantly was struggling to loosen the grip of this tightly
held oligopoly.142 Particularly cognizant of the state's repeated fail-
ures,14 3 the Court simply refused to impede the legislature in its efforts
to deal with a highly unique and recurring problem. 44 Thus, one
might profitably read Midkiff as adopting a pragmatic approach by
which a court closely analyzes the facts of each case to determine
whether the public use doctrine should be extended to allow needed
social and economic reform, or conversely, should be restricted to fend
off legislative abuses of private property rights.145
Unfortunately, courts will probably extend the Midkiff decision well
beyond its facts; the language employed is certainly as broad as that
found in Berman. 46 The Court's reliance on Berman, however, is sub-
ject to criticism. Berman involved a situation in which the government
identified a specific area as infested with urban blight, condemned only
that area, and reconveyed it to private developers subject to explicit
140. The Supreme Court's adherence to this philosophy is evidenced by the fact
that the Court, in this century, has not held a use to be private that a state court has
found to be public. See Note, supra note 17, at 609 n.54.
141. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
142. See supra note 112.
143. 104 S.Ct. at 2330. Justice O'Connor likened the Hawaiian situation to that
faced by the colonists after the American Revolution, when landowners had encum-
bered large portions of the land with feudal incidents. In response to this situation,
several states enacted statutes for the purpose of eliminating such incidents. Id.
144. See id. at 2331, in which the Court stated: "As the unique way titles were held
in Hawaii skewed the land market, exercise of the power of eminent domain was justi-
fied." Id.
145. Professor Meidinger suggests that this is exactly what courts have done:
The main question is not whether a taking is for a "public" purpose, but whether it
is for a legitimate purpose. By retaining the public use requirement without clearly
defining it, the courts have retained, perhaps cannily, the prerogative of reviewing
the legitimacy and wisdom of particular purposes.
Meidinger, supra note 19, at 43 (emphasis in original).
146. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
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regulation.' 47 The Berman Court did not seriously question whether
urban renewal constituted a legitimate public purpose-the courts had
decided that question nearly thirty years earlier' 48-but only whether
accomplishing this purpose via private enterprise violated the public
use clause.' 49
By stark contrast, the Hawaii Land Reform Act authorizes condem-
nations at the behest of the individual lessee.15° The HHA makes no
initial inquiry as to whether there exists any need in the particular area
for greater dispersion of fee simple ownership. In fact, in 1976 the
legislature deleted a requirement that the HHA find a shortage of fee
simple property in the county where the condemnation is to take
place.15' If the evils that the Act seeks to cure are due to the shortage
of fee simple residential land,' 52 it would seem reasonable that petition-
ers seeking condemnation show that a shortage exists before proceed-
ings begin.
Another troubling aspect of the condemnation scheme in Midkiff is
the absence of any regulation of the property subsequent to the tak-
ing. '53 The tenant, upon obtaining title to the property, is free to lease
it out again on a long-term basis.1 54 In Berman, the government em-
phasized that the Redevelopment Act required private developers to
conform to a detailed redevelopment plan designed to maximize the
public benefit.' 55 In the absence of some form of continuing regula-
147. 348 U.S. at 28-29.
148. See. e.g., New York City Housing Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333 (1936). See
also supra note 69.
149. 348 U.S. at 33-36.
150. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 516-22 (1976). See supra note 119.
151. See 1976 Hawaii Sess. Laws, Act. 242 § 2 (codified at HAWAII REV. STAT.
§ 516-83 (A) (2-3)).
152. See id.
153. See Midkiff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 804 (9th Cir. 1983) (Poole, J. concurring),
rev'd sub nom. Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 104 S.Ct. 2321 (1984).
154. Id.
155. See Brief for the D.C. Redevelopment Land Agency and National Capital
Planning Commission at 28-29, Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). The Solicitor
General stated:
The lessee or purchaser is not given a free hand to deal with the property as he
wishes. Instead, he is expressly required to conform to the redevelopment plan
.... Congress has thus made specific and detailed provisions for such continuing
supervision as is necessary to assure the attainment of its objectives.
Id. See also Puerto Rico v. Eastern Sugar Assoc's., 156 F.2d 316, 323 (lst Cir. 1946), in
which the court noted the "comprehensive program of social and economic reform."
Id.
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tion, courts cannot ensure that those taking property in the name of
public use will continue to use the property in a way that benefits the
public.156
Finally, the Midkiff Court ignored the unique nature of the legisla-
tion involved. The Hawaii Land Reform Act empowers the HHA to
transfer land by eminent domain to achieve a social goal and not to
make a change in the land itself. This fact significantly distinguishes
Midkiff from the earlier public use cases. In the urban renewal
cases, 157 for example, condemning agencies cleared areas infested with
urban blight and replaced them with public housing projects. Simi-
larly, in Eastern Sugar Associates, 5 8 the government took land with
the intention of changing methods of farming. Thus, the result in
Midkiff is that the Supreme Court has provided state and local govern-
ments with a new means to enforce social reforms. Armed with this
expansive interpretation of the public use limitation, local governments
desiring to implement new reforms need only hint at the possibility of
an eminent domain action to assure compliance in the private sector.' 5 9
Midkiffclearly illustrates the potential danger of substituting the po-
lice power-substantive due process test for the public use requirement
in eminent domain actions. The issue is not a novel concern. 160 When
reviewing regulations that fall under the police power, courts tradition-
ally consider three factors: (1) whether there exists a legitimate gov-
ernment concern; (2) whether the regulation is reasonably related to
the end it seeks to achieve; and (3) whether the regulation is unduly
156. Justice Ryan states in his Poletown dissent: "[I]t is clear that public control of
the use of the land after transfer to the private entity invests the taking with far greater
public attributes than would exist without the control and fortifies the justification for
the abridgement of individual property rights in those cases." 410 Mich. at 679 (Ryan,
J., dissenting). See also Bennett, supra note 53, at 148-49 (suggesting that where private
interests benefit from condemnation, those interests have obligation to ensure the
claimed public benefit).
157. See supra notes 66-77 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
159. It is, of course, not necessary that the state courts adopt Midkiffs broad inter-
pretation; however, past experience suggests that the state courts will indeed adhere to
the Supreme Court's view. See supra note 77.
160. See, e.g., Note, State Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Eminent Do-
main, 77 HARv. L. REV. 717, 718-19 (1964). The author argues that certain factors
justify a higher level of review for the power of eminent domain than normally is ap-
plied to other government powers. Among the factors discussed are the inadequacy of
compensation and the lack of political safeguards for individual condemnees. See also
Note, supra note 15, at 424-38.
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oppressive. 161 This is a more lenient standard than the public use stan-
dard, which is the appropriate test to apply in a takings case. 162 By
substituting the police power standards for the public use requirement,
courts are effectively removing one of the few viable limitations on the
government's taking power. State legislatures desiring to condemn a
tract of private property can easily conclude that they take the action
for the public use and thus remain free from judicial intervention.
Justice Marshall established long ago that all clauses in the Constitu-
tion are presumed to have some effect. 163 The presence of the public
use clause within the Bill of Rights suggests that the Framers intended
it to be a limiting principle.1" A court faced with a contested taking
must follow an approach that adequately recognizes both the govern-
ment's need for latitude in addressing social and economic problems,
and the individual's need for protection from wrongful deprivations of
his private property. Only by meeting such a balanced standard can a
government taking be deemed legitimate.
IV. IN DEFENSE OF A STRICTER STANDARD
FOR EMINENT DOMAIN
Midkiff represents, perhaps, the final blow in a struggle that has not
gone unnoticed by courts and commentators. The relaxation of the
public use requirement has inspired numerous proposals aimed at
strengthening the protections available to private property owners.
1 65
161. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). See also Stoebuck, San Diego
Gas: Problems, Pitfalls and a Better Way, 25 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 23-24
(1983).
162. 2 NICHOLS, supra note 2, at § 7.11 [3]. That the police power standard is more
lenient becomes clear when one considers that police actions involve only the regulation
of private property. Because the landowner does not suffer the ultimate deprivation-
complete loss of his property through transfer to another entity-the standard applied
to the action need not be as rigorous. For an analysis of the differences between police
power regulations and takings, see Stoebuck, supra note 161, at 36-40.
163. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 150 (1803).
164 James Madison, considered by most to be the Father of the Constitution, was
aware of the need to place certain rights and interests beyond the reach of majoritarian
politics. Madison predicted that "in future times a great majority of the people will not
only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These [may] ... combine under
the influence of their common situation; in which case the rights of property & the
public liberty, [will not be secure in their hands] ..... .2 THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 203-04 (M. Farrand ed. 1911), reprinted in Midkiff v.
Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir. 1983).
165 See Berger, supra note 33, at 237-46; Meidinger, supra note 19, at 43-49.
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The suggested approaches, while differing in certain particulars, are
similar in two respects: the need for a more active judiciary at the state
court level and the desirability of a stricter public benefit test.
A. Heightened Judicial Scrutiny at the State Court Level
When examining condemnations by state authorities, federal courts
should adhere to a more deferential standard of review. 166 This ap-
proach preserves the balance between federal and state powers, and
encourages potential litigants to pursue their claims in the state courts.
Apart from lightening the federal docket, deference at the federal level
is desirable because state courts are better qualified to decide public use
issues under their own state constitutions. Unfortunately, in establish-
ing their deferential stance, the federal courts often have employed
very broad language that has had great influence on many state
courts. 1
6 7
Few of the reasons supporting deference at the federal level apply to
state courts. Of course, one can make similar arguments with respect
to the state legislature's need to have a free hand in all legislative mat-
ters, but several factors exist that make the argument much less con-
vincing. Foremost among these is the fact that state legislatures derive
their authority from state constitutions, which are free to include re-
strictions on legislative power that the federal Constitution does not
recognize. 16  Even when state and federal constitutions are identically
worded, state courts are free to interpret their own constitutions as
implying added restraints.1 69 Thus, Supreme Court interpretations of
the federal Constitution do not necessarily provide strong support for
judicial deference at the state level. 170
Another consideration commonly recognized as favoring heightened
review by state courts is the perceived incompetence of the local deci-
166. See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
167. See supra note 77.
168. See Developments in the Law-The Interpretation of State Constitutional
Rights, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1324, 1478-82 (1982). The article analyzes several state con-
stitutions that evince a clear intent to limit the ability of the legislature to interfere with
property rights. Id. at 1482 & n. 114. It also points out that several state courts have
interpreted their constitutions as requiring substantive review when economic interests
are impaired. Id. at 1480.
169. Id. at 1497.
170. Brennan, supra note 103, at 502. Justice Brennan states that "the decisions of
the [Supreme] Court are not, and should not be, dispositive of questions regarding
rights guaranteed by counterpart provisions of state law." Id.
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sion-making process. 7 ' Municipal land use authorities are often
under-staffed, self-interested and highly susceptible to outside manipu-
lation. '7 2 Under such circumstances, some commentators suggest that
the courts provide a more legitimate forum in which to determine pub-
lic use.' 73 Midkiff highlights the concern of self-interested condemna-
tion in that the HHA does not make the initial decision to begin
condemnation proceedings; rather, the recipient himself makes the
decision. '74
Rounding out this list of concerns supporting heightened state judi-
cial scrutiny is the strength of the individual need to own property and
the political vulnerability of small groups. 17 5 Monetary compensation
can rarely mend broken emotional ties. Relocation for some people,
especially the elderly, can be a very painful experience. Furthermore,
depending on how the court arrives at "just" compensation, there are
likely to be expenses that the award does not cover. 17 6 To make mat-
ters worse, under newly designed "quick-take" laws, 177 the decision to
condemn is often made before the condemnee has an opportunity to
present his case. Even were such a chance provided, the individual
condemnee is unlikely to be able to muster significant political force to
effect a change in the outcome.
So long as courts continue their pattern of deference in eminent do-
main cases, these hardships will go unnoticed. To prevent this from
happening, courts must be willing to conduct a more rigorous inquiry
into legislative determinations of public use.
171. Note, supra note 15, at 432-35.
172. Id. Judicial deference in situations in which a condemning agency's integrity is
at issue is particularly dangerous. Deerfield Park Dist. v. Progress Dev. Corp., 26 Il1.2d
296, 186 N.E.2d 360 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 968 (1963), offers a good example.
Deerfield, an affluent suburb of Chicago, condemned certain land for the stated purpose
of building a park. The suburb decided to condemn the land only days after an an-
nouncement that a low-cost housing development would be constructed on the site.
Nevertheless, the court held that unless the condemnee could show that discrimination
was the sole purpose of the condemnation, it would not inquire into the town's motive.
173. See Note, supra note 15, at 437-38.
174. See supra notes 117-19 and 150 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 160.
176. Business goodwill and moving expenses are examples of costs that courts usu-
ally do not include in compensation. See Note, supra note 160, at 718.
177. See Note, supra note 51, at 319 & n.89. Governments enact these laws to
expedite the legal procedures required to acquire property through condemnation. To
be subject to the law. the condemning authority must show a high degree of necessity.
Id. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 213.51 to 213.77 (1980).
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B. A Stricter Standard for Public Use
A second approach to the problem of revitalizing the public use re-
quirement imposes certain standards on all local condemnation
schemes. For example, Justice Ryan's Poletown dissent suggests three
factors that should be present in all takings that involve a transfer to
third parties.17 The first factor requires that all such takings be for
"public necessity of the extreme sort." 179 Ryan points to railroads,
highways and canals as traditional examples of such necessity. The
second factor Ryan considers indispensable is continuing accountabil-
ity to the public.18 ° If states are to authorize the condemnation of pri-
vate property under the auspices of public benefit, then they must
subsequently regulate the property to ensure that the benefit is main-
tained. 81 Third, Ryan insists that the condemning agency retain un-
fettered discretion when selecting the condemnation site. 182 The
agency must base its decision solely on considerations of the public
interest, free from any undue private influence. 183
While stopping short of Justice Ryan's strict test, several state stat-
utes contain language inviting a narrower application of the public ben-
efit test. 18 4 These provisions are generally similar to the first step of
Justice Ryan's test in that they require a condemning agency to con-
sider whether a particular tract of property is necessary to achieve
some public purpose.185 When alternatives exist that appear less injuri-
ous to the private interests at stake, the government must provide some
reasonable explanation for not pursuing those alternatives.' 86
Under such an approach, courts might also insist that the recipients
178. Poletown, 410 Mich. 616, 674-75, 304 N.W.2d 455, 460 (1981) (Ryan J.,
dissenting).
179. Id. at 675, 304 N.W.2d at 467.
180. Id. at 677, 304 N.W.2d at 467.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 680, 304 N.W.2d at 469.
183. Id. at 681, 304 N.W.2d at 469.
184. See, eg., MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 93-9906 (1964); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-
15-02 (1975).
185. The Montana provision reads, in pertinent part: "[I]n all cases where land is
required for public use ... it must be located in the manner which will be the most
compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury." MONT. REV.
CODE ANN. § 93-9906 (1964).
186. Several state court decisions have shifted the burden to the condemning agency
in this manner. See, e.g., Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So.2d 451, 455
(Fla. 1975); Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash.2d 799, 838, 341 P.2d 171, 193 (1959).
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of condemned property conform to some sort of predetermined plan.
When a state legislature purportedly has identified an area of public
need that necessitates the taking of private property, it is not unreason-
able to require an overall plan guaranteeing that the property will, in
fact, be put to the contemplated public use.1 8 7
Whatever standard the courts choose to follow, they must require
the condemning agencies to provide rational justification for their ac-
tions. It is not enough that such agencies simply proclaim a public use,
for any agency bent on condemning a person's property certainly can
conclude that doing so will further the public interest. By placing the
burden on the agency to show that the taking will further the pro-
claimed public use, courts can ensure that both the needs of govern-
ment and the rights of individuals are protected.
V. CONCLUSION
It is evident that the public use requirement, though once strictly
construed, has been drastically relaxed to the point that it provides no
definite limits on the government's power to expropriate private prop-
erty. The courts retain the doctrine in an undefined form, but seldom
apply it. Rather, they have adopted a police power-substantive due
process approach that precludes any meaningful judicial review.
Under this approach, courts merely examine whether the stated pur-
pose of the condemnation could possibly increase the public good by
any insignificant degree. So long as the possibility exists, courts will
not inquire whether the taking is reasonably necessary to accomplish
the stated purpose.
Substituting the more deferential police power standard for the pub-
lic use requirement is unjustifiable. The power of eminent domain and
the police power exist independently of each other and courts should
review the use of these powers under their respective standards. State
courts should not read the broad language employed by the federal
courts, such as that found in Midkiff, as unduly limiting judicial re-
view. The cherished position of private property in our society, and
the vulnerability of the individual whose property is taken, dictate that
the state courts carefully review applications of the eminent domain
power. So long as this review proceeds from an awareness of the gov-
eminent's need for flexibility and latitude, courts can use the public use
requirement effectively to guard against legislative abuses.
187. See supra note 153-56 and accompanying text.
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